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Redemption:
for
Chance
A
Revising the "Persecutor Bar" and
"Material Support Bar" in the
Case of Child Soldiers
ABSTRACT

Armed groups in conflicts around the world frequently
exploit child soldiers. Despite the unique experience of child
soldiers, who are frequently recruited by means of force and
deceit, immigration law as it is currently applied may bar
former child soldiers from receiving asylum in the United
States. In particular,the prevailing agency interpretationof the
"persecutor bar" and the "material support bar" equates child
soldiers with adults who have committed serious atrocities.
This Note argues that the application of these asylum bars to
former child soldiers runs against social values and standards
of moral culpability in the United States. Child soldiers are
perceived as victims in popular culture and internationallaw
rather than perpetrators.Drawingupon U.S. criminal law, this
Note reasons that the common law principles of infancy and
duress favor a reinterpretationof the immigration laws as they
apply to child soldiers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Armed groups currently exploit approximately 300,000 child
soldiers in more than thirty conflicts worldwide.'
These groups
recruit children to serve as soldiers through the use of force or
manipulation, often abducting them from the streets, their schools, or
even directly from their homes. 2 Once recruited, children serve both
as servants and combatants. 3 Often, armed groups give children
drugs and alcohol as a means to manipulate them into committing
atrocities. 4 Moreover, child soldiers are themselves victimized by

1.
COALITION TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS, GUIDE TO THE OPTIONAL
PROTOCOL ON THE INVOLVEMENT OF CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT 3 (2003), available

at www.unicef.org/publications/files/option-protocol conflict.pdf [hereinafter GUIDE TO
THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL]. The term "child soldier" is not precisely defined but is
generally understood to mean any person (boy or girl) under the age of eighteen "who is
or who has been recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity,
including but not limited to children, boys, and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters,
messengers, spies or for sexual purposes. ... [But] does not only refer to a child who is
taking or has taken a direct part in hostilities." The Paris International Conference
"Free Children From War," Feb. 5-6, 2007, ParisPrinciples:Principles and Guidelines
on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups, para. 2.1 (Feb. 2007).
2.
3.

GUIDE TO THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL, supra note 1, at 3.
Id.; UNICEF, FACTSHEET: CHILD SOLDIERS 1, http://www.unicef.org/emerg/

files/childsoldiers.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2009).
4.
Matthew Happold, Excluding Children from Refugee Status: Child Soldiers
and Article 1F of the Refugee Convention, 17 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. 1131, 1139 (2002).
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their leaders who beat, rape, and kill their recruits.5 The experience
leaves former child soldiers physically and psychologically damaged. 6
Although there are a large number of former child soldiers in the
world, a relatively small number are either candidates for
resettlement in the United States or have escaped to the United
States and have attempted to petition for asylum.7 U.S. immigration
law, as it is currently interpreted and applied by agencies and courts,
inconsistently addresses the problems of child soldiers. In an attempt
to take a moral stand against the practice of recruiting child soldiers,
those individuals who use and recruit child soldiers are barred from
receiving asylum. 8 However, the mandatory bars to asylum may also
exclude former child soldiers from attaining legal status in the United
States.9
Two statutory bars to asylum-the "persecutor bar" and the
"material support bar"-stand between former child soldiers and the
opportunity to receive asylum in the United States.x0 First, the
persecutor bar excludes aliens who have committed certain acts of
persecution from the definition of a refugee." The broad definition of
persecution, as both the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and
federal courts have historically interpreted it, encompasses the types
of acts that child soldiers are often forced to perform.' 2 Second, the

5.
Id. at 1138-39.
6.
GUIDE TO THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL, supra note 1, at 3; see also COALITION
TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS, RETURNING HOME: CHILDREN'S PERSPECTIVE ON
REINTEGRATION 18-21 (2008), available at http://www.child-soldiers.org/psychosocial/ReturningHome_-_Children s-perspectives-onjreintegration -_Acasestudy.
ofchildrenabducted by-the Lord s-ResistanceArmy inTesoeasternUganda_February_2008.pdf (describing the psychological problems of returned child soldiers).
7.
Casualties of War: Child Soldiers and the Law: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Human Rights and the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. 13-16 (2007) (statement of Anwen Hughes, Senior Counsel, Refugee Protection
Program, Human Rights First) [hereinafter Casualties of War]; Brief for Human Rights
First et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 28, Negusie v. Mukasey, 129 S. Ct.
1159 (2009) (No. 07-499), 2008 WL 2597010 (Jun. 23, 2008) [hereinafter Human Rights
First Briefl.
8.
See Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008 (CSAA), Pub. L. No. 110-340,
§ 2, 122 Stat. 3735 (2008) (adding "recruiting or using child soldiers" as a ground of
inadmissibility and removability).
9.
Casualtiesof War, supra note 7.
10.
See Mary-Hunter Morris, Note, Babies and Bathwater: Seeking an
Appropriate Standardof Review for the Asylum Applications of Former Child Soldiers,
21 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 281, 288-89 (2008) (explaining that the material support bar is
a significant barrier to asylum for child soldiers); Benjamin Ruesch, Note, Open the
Golden Door: Practical Solutions for Child-Soldiers Seeking Asylum in the United
States, 29 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 184, 198-204 (2008) (describing the effects of the
material support bar and the persecutor bar on child soldiers seeking asylum).
11.
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)
(2000).
12.
See, e.g., Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985) (defining
persecution as "either a threat to the life or freedom of, or the infliction of suffering or
harm upon, those who differ in a way regarded as offensive"). For a discussion of the
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material support bar excludes applicants for engaging in terrorist
activities.' 3 As applied, the material support bar has an expansive
definition of terrorist activity that includes acts child soldiers are
frequently forced to commit and includes no explicit exception for
duress that could exclude child soldiers from its sweeping
definition.1 4 Because many of the groups that recruit and use child
soldiers are either defined as terrorist groups or engage in activities
deemed to be terroristic in nature, child soldiers may be excluded
under this bar.' 5 These asylum bars are in tension with the broader
view of child soldiers as victims rather than persecutors.1 6 Moreover,
this particular area of law does not take into consideration the
general approach of U.S. law towards children, which allows both
infancy and duress as defenses.' 7
This Note advocates changing the approach of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) towards child soldiers. The law should
take into account the special circumstances of child soldiers, namely
their youth and the heightened form of duress that led to their
involvement in conflict. Part II of this Note examines the statutory
background of the persecutor bar and the material support bar, as
well as the current administrative and judicial interpretations of the
bars and the impact of these bars upon child soldiers. Part III
analyzes the current framework's theoretical shortfalls by drawing
upon principles of U.S. criminal law, as well as its practical shortfalls
in terms of the health and safety of the child soldiers and
international security. Part IV advocates for a revised approach,
either through agency interpretation or legislation, to the asylum
bars in order to facilitate the admission of former child soldiers into
the United States.

experiences of child soldiers "in action," see P.W. SINGER, CHILDREN AT WAR 80-88
(2006) (describing how child soldiers will obediently engage in "dangerous and
horrifying assignments").
13.
INA § 212(a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B).
14.
Gregory F. Laufer, Note, Admission Denied: In Support of a Duress
Exception to the Immigration and Nationality Act's "MaterialSupport for Terrorism"
Provision, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 437, 443-44 (2006).
15.
Id. at 442.
16.
Human Rights First Brief, supra note 7, at 18. The U.S. and the
international community have responded to the issue of child soldiers as a threat to the
human rights of children and have adopted a number of international treaties and
domestic laws. See, e.g., Int'l Labour Org. [ILO], Worst Forms of Child Labour
Convention, 1999, No. 182, 87th Sess. (June 17, 1999) (listing the use of children in
armed conflict as the first element in the definition of "worst forms of child labour").
17.
See Happold, supra note 4, at 1146-72 (arguing that in order to be culpable,
criminal law typically requires mens rea as well as actus reus and noting that courts
will not impose criminal liability without the necessary guilty mind).
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BACKGROUND

A. Bars to Asylum
Under the INA, in order for an alien to be eligible for asylum, the
alien must meet the definition of a refugee under § 101(a)(42).18 The
INA defines a refugee as a person who is "unable or unwilling to
return to . . . [a] country because of persecution or a well-founded fear

of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion."1 9 However, not all
aliens who meet this threshold definition are eligible for asylum.20
This Part addresses the two statutory bars to asylum most often
applied to child soldiers-the persecutor bar and the material support
bar.
1.

The Persecutor Bar

The definition of "refugee" explicitly excludes "any person who
ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution
of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion." 2 1 This exclusion,
commonly referred to as the "persecutor bar," gives the Secretary of
Homeland Security authority to deny certain forms of relief, such as
asylum and withholding of removal, to any alien who has engaged in
the enumerated conduct. 22
The language of the persecutor bar has its origins in the
Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (DPA). 2 3 The DPA was enacted in an

18.
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)
(2000).
19.
Id.
20.
Id. In order to qualify for asylum, an alien must both meet the definition of
a refugee under section 101(a)(42) of the INA and not fall under certain exceptions
articulated in § 208. See INA § 208(b)(2)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A).
21.
INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
22.
See INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) (barring aliens who
engaged in persecution from asylum); INA § 241(b)(3)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(i)
(barring aliens who persecuted others from receiving withholding of removal); Negusie
v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009) (applying the term "persecutor bar" to
§§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) and 1231(b)(3)(B)(i)). Note, however, that this bar does not exclude
all forms of relief available to immigrants; under some circumstances, immigrants may
be eligible for temporary relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
23.
Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, ch. 647, § 2, 62 Stat.
1009 (1948), amended by Act of June 16, 1950, ch. 262, Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat.
219, and Act of June 28, 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-60, 65 Stat. 96 (incorporating by
reference the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, Annex I, pt. II,
§ 2, opened for signatureDec. 15, 1946, 62 Stat. 3037, 18 U.N.T.S. 3).

196

VANDERBILT/OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL, 43:191

effort to facilitate European immigration after World War 11.24 In
defining the scope of those eligible for relief, the DPA restricted its
benefits to those aliens who met the definition of a displaced person
under the International Refugee Organization's Constitution (IRO
Constitution). 25 In turn, the IRO Constitution explicitly excluded
individuals who "voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the
outbreak of the [S]econd [W]orld [Wiar in their operations against the
United Nations."26 A 1950 amendment to the DPA moved the
exclusion under the IRO Constitution into the text of the DPA itself
and further refined its language to exclude persons who "advocated or
assisted in the persecution of any person because of race, religion, or
national origin." 27 The Holtzman Amendment of 1978 expanded the
application of the persecutor exclusion beyond the visa program
under the DPA to all individuals seeking admission to the United
States who engaged in Nazi acts.2 8 However, it was not until 1980
that the United States enacted comprehensive legislation to deal with
refugees, which included a broad bar to asylum for any immigrant
who engaged in persecution. 2 9
The legislative history of the persecutor bar is significant
because the term "persecution" is not defined in the INA.30 The
ambiguity of the term stemmed in part from Congress's (mistaken)
belief at the time the Refugee Act of 1980 was adopted that the term
persecution had already been defined.3 1
As a result, cases

24.
Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 495 (1981).
25.
Displaced Persons Act § 2(b).
26.
Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, Annex I, pt. II, § 2,
opened for signature Dec. 15, 1946, 62 Stat. 3037, 18 U.N.T.S. 3. In full, the IRO
Constitution states that certain persons will not be the concern of the organization,
namely individuals shown:
(a) to have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of countries,
Members of the United Nations; or
(b) to have voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the outbreak of the
second world war in their operations against the United Nations.
Id.
27.
Pub. L. No. 81-555, ch. 262, sec. 11, § 13, 64 Stat. 219 (1950) (amending
section 13 of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948).
28.
Lori K. Walls, The Persecutor Bar in U.S. Immigration Law: Toward a
More Nuanced Understandingof Modern "Persecution"in the Case of Forced Abortion
and Female Genital Cutting, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 227, 230-31 (2007).
29.
Id. at 231; The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
30.
Nicole Lerescu, Note, Barring Too Much: An Argument In Favor of
Interpreting the Immigration and Nationality Act Section 101(A)(42) To Include a
Duress Exception, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1875, 1879 (2007).
31.
H.R. REP. NO. 95-1452, at 1 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4700,
4701-02.
Although our permanent immigration law has never expressly excluded from
admission into the United States aliens who have participated in persecution,
similar provisions have appeared in special legislative enactments providing for
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interpreting persecution under the DPA, most significantly Fedorenko
v. United States, have historically exerted substantial influence over
the interpretation of the term under the INA by immigration judges,
the Board of Immigration Appeals, and federal courts.3 2
a.

Fedorenko and its Progeny

Fedorenko v. United States addressed the immigration status of
Feodor Fedorenko, who initially served in the Russian Army but was
conscripted to serve in several concentration camps during World
War II after being captured by the Germans in 1941.33 Fedorenko
claimed that he served as a guard against his will and was not
personally involved in any of the atrocities committed at the
concentration camps. 3 4 After the war, Fedorenko applied for and
received a visa under the DPA by claiming to have spent the war
years first as a farmer and then as a factory worker.3 5
The Supreme Court held that because Fedorenko misrepresented
his activities during the war on his visa application, he became
ineligible for a visa upon entry and as a result the Court revoked his
citizenship.3 6 The Court analyzed the language in § 2(a) of the IRO
Constitution (as incorporated by the DPA) in order to determine that
Fedorenko's misrepresentation did in fact render him ineligible for a
visa.37 In reaching this conclusion, the Court explained that it would
not imply a voluntariness requirement based on the plain language of
the statute.3 8 The Court found support for this interpretation in
comparing the language of § 2(a) to the language in § 2(b) of the IRO
Constitution.3 9 Drawing upon the canon of construction expressio
unius est inclusio alterius, the Court explained that because Congress
expressly included the word "voluntary" in § 2(b), "the deliberate
omission of the word 'voluntary' from § 2(a) compels the conclusion

the admission of refugees and certain other displaced persons after World War
II. For example, Section 13 of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 prohibited the
admission of aliens under that act who advocated or assisted in the persecution
of any person because of race, religion, or national origin.
Id.
32.
449 U.S. 490 (1981).
33.
Id. at 494.
34.
Id. at 500. Specifically, Fedorenko claimed that he only served as a
perimeter guard and had only ever "shot in the general direction of escaping inmates."
Id.
35.
Id. at 496, 500.
36.
See id. at 514, 518 (holding that as a matter of law Fedorenko was
ineligible for a visa and that Fedorenko's citizenship had to be revoked because it was
illegally procured).
37.
Id. at 512.
Id.
38.
39.
Id.
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that the statute made all those who assisted in the persecution of
civilians ineligible for visas." 40 Therefore, the Court determined that
service in a concentration camp-"whether
voluntary or
involuntary-made [Fedorenko] ineligible for a visa."4 1 In a footnote
that has been the foundation of voluntariness analysis under the
INA, the Court explained:
The solution . . . lies, not in "interpreting" the Act to include a
voluntariness requirement that the statute itself does not impose, but
in focusing on whether particular conduct can be considered assisting
in the persecution of civilians. Thus, an individual who did no more
than cut the hair of female inmates before they were executed cannot
be found to have assisted in the persecution of civilians. On the other
hand, there can be no question that a guard who was issued a uniform
and armed with a rifle and a pistol, who was paid a stipend and was
regularly allowed to leave the concentration camp to visit a nearby
village, and who admitted to shooting at escaping inmates on orders
from the commandant of the camp, fits within the statutory language
42
about persons who assisted in the persecution of civilians.

Thus, Fedorenko established the proposition, within the context of the
DPA, that persecutory acts need not be entirely voluntary to be
sufficient grounds to deny an immigration benefit. 43
The true significance of the Court's decision in Fedorenko stems
from the subsequent application of its analysis to the persecutor bar
by the BIA and federal courts. 44 The BIA first applied Fedorenko to
the INA in Matter of Laipenieks.4 5 There, the BIA reasoned that
because Fedorenko relied on the absence of a voluntariness
requirement in the plain text of the DPA, likewise, the absence of an
explicit voluntariness requirement in the persecutor bar under the
INA implied that no scienter was required. 46 The BIA concluded that
"the respondent's particular

motivations or intent . . . is not a

relevant factor" in determining whether to apply the persecutor bar. 47
Subsequently, in Matter of Rodriguez-Majano, the BIA explained:
"[P]articipation or assistance in persecution need not be of [the

40.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
41.
Id.
42.
Id. at 514 n.34.
43.
See generally id. at 512 (analyzing the voluntariness issue under section
2(b) of the DPA).
See, e.g., Matter of Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 811 (B.I.A. 1988);
44.
Matter of Laipenieks, 18 I. & N. Dec. 433 (B.I.A. 1983); Diaz-Zanatta v. Holder, 558
F.3d 450 (6th Cir. 2009); Singh v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 736, 740 (7th Cir. 2005); Bah v.
Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2003).
Matter of Laipenieks, 18 1. & N. Dec. at 463.
45.
Id. at 463-64. ("[W]e find that the plain language of the Amendment
46.
mandates a literal interpretation, and that the omission of an intent element compels
the conclusion that section 241(a)(19) makes all those who assisted in the specified
persecution deportable.").
47.
Id. at 464.
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alien's] own volition to bar him from relief."48 The court went on to
articulate that it is not the intent of the alien, but rather the objective
effect of the persecution that is controlling. 49 The interpretation
espoused by the BIA effectively eliminates a scienter requirement
and therefore disregards an alien's "internal, subjective mental state"
in determining whether to apply the persecutor bar.5 0
In Bah v. Ashcroft, the Fifth Circuit applied this reasoning to the
case of a child soldier from Sierra Leone. 5 After watching members
of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) incinerate his father and
rape and murder his sister, Bah was given the choice of either joining
the rebel forces himself or being killed. 52 Bah was drugged and
forced to engage in atrocities like shooting female prisoners and
chopping off the "the hands, legs, and heads of civilians."5 3 Although
Bah attempted to escape the RUF twice, he was recaptured each
time. 54
After a failed attack by the RUF on Freetown, Bah
successfully escaped both the rebels and Sierra Leone, eventually
arriving in the United States.55 The court rejected Bah's argument
that the persecutor bar should not defeat his claim for withholding of
removal because he was forcibly recruited into the RUF. 56 The Fifth
Circuit explained that "[t]he syntax of the statute suggests that the
alien's personal motivation is not relevant."5 7 Undertaking the same
method of analysis as the BIA in Matter of Rodriguez-Majano, the
court emphasized that an objective act of persecution triggered the
bar.5 8 The court held that Bah was ineligible for withholding of
removal for the simple reason that "Bah participated in persecution,
and the persecution occurred because of an individual's political
opinions." 59
However, other circuits, most significantly the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits, have interpreted the INA to include a more significant
scienter requirement.6 0 For example, the Ninth Circuit recently

48.
Matter of Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 811, 814 (B.I.A. 1988).
49.
Id. (citing Laipenieks v. INS, 750 F.2d 1427, 1435 (9th Cir. 1985)).
50.
Lerescu, supra note 30, at 1883.
51.
341 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 349.
52.
53.
See id. at 350 (explaining that Bah was taught to use cocaine after he joined
the RUF).
Id.
54.
Id.
55.
56.
Id. at 351.
57.
Id.
58.
See id. (emphasizing that the placement of "because" in the statute
deemphasized the issue of intent and that, therefore, the intent of the alien was not
relevant).
59.
Id.
60.
See Lerescu, supra note 30, at 1886 (explaining that the Eight and Ninth
Circuits treat voluntariness as an essential prerequisite to applying the persecutor bar
under INA section 101(a)(42)).
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explained in MirandaAlvarado v. Gonzales that, in order to make a
finding that an alien "assisted in persecution," a court must
undertake a "particularized evaluation of both personal involvement
and purposeful assistance in order to ascertain culpability."61
Applying this principle, the court nonetheless found that Miranda
Alvarado had engaged in persecution because of the centrality of his
role to the perpetration of persecution when he was forced to assist
the Sendero Luminoso in Peru as an interpreter. 62
b.

Opening the Door: Negusie v. Holder

To resolve the differing interpretations of the voluntariness
requirement under the persecutor bar, the Supreme Court granted
State officials captured the
certiorari to Negusie v. Holder.63
petitioner, Daniel Negusie, in 1994 and forced him to serve in the
After being
Navy after first subjecting him to hard labor. 64
conscripted a second time in 1998, Negusie was incarcerated because
he refused to fight against Ethiopia. 65 Following his release, Negusie
was forced to serve as a prison guard on a military base over the
course of four years. 66 During this time, the prisoners guarded by
Negusie were unquestionably persecuted on the basis of one of the
protected grounds defined by the INA (i.e. "race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion").6 7
Rather than addressing the issue squarely, the Court, in an
opinion by Justice Kennedy, held that "the BIA misapplied . . .
Fedorenko as mandating that an alien's motivation and intent are
irrelevant to the issue whether an alien assisted in persecution." 68 In
attacking Fedorenko as binding law on the question of voluntariness
under the INA, the Court relied primarily on the differences in the
structure and purpose between the INA and the DPA.69 The Court
emphasized that the Congressional motivation behind the Refugee
Act of 1980 was dramatically different from that of the DPA; namely,
while the DPA was a response to the horrors of World War II, the

61.
449 F.3d 915, 927 (9th Cir. 2006).
62.
Id. at 928.
63.
See Negusie v. Gonzales, 231 Fed. Appx. 325 (5th Cir. 2007), rev'd sub nom.
Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009).
64.
Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. at 1162; Brief for Petitioner at 14, Negusie v.
Holder, 129 S.Ct. 1159 (2008) (No. 07-499).
65.
Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. at 1162. Note that the reason Negusie refused
to fight when conscripted the second time is that he is "a dual national of Ethiopia and
Eritrea, his mother being from Ethiopia and his father being from Eritrea." Id.
66.
Id.; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 64, at 15.
67.
Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. at 1162-63; Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000).
68.
Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. at 1163.
69.
See id. at 1165.
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Refugee Act was intended to "provide a general rule for the ongoing
treatment of all refugees and displaced persons."70
However, having concluded that Fedorenko was not mandatory
authority with regard to the persecutor bar under the INA, the Court
simply remanded the case to the BIA to decide "[w]hether the statute
permits such an interpretation based on a different course of
reasoning" rather than articulating a new standard.71 Because the
Department of Homeland Security has "not yet exercised its Chevron
discretion," there remains an open question as to how persecution
should be analyzed in the future.7 2 The Court's holding heavily
suggests that the BIA should take the opportunity on remand to
establish a more comprehensive framework to analyze the meaning of
the term "persecution." 73 The BIA thus will have the unique
opportunity to reassess the statute and its application to the
persecutor bar.
c.

Application of the Persecutor Bar to Child Soldiers

The persecutor bar extends to child soldiers because children kill
and injure "because of" a statutorily enumerated ground when they
serve as combatants.74
However, the situation of child soldiers
presents one of the most compelling cases for the application of a lessstringent standard.75 Although child soldiers have overcome the bar
in some cases, 76 the government continues to raise the persecutor bar
when confronted with a child soldier- particularly in cases where the
children were "voluntarily" recruited.7 7

70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id. at 1167.
Id.
See id. at 1168.

The agency's interpretation of the statutory meaning of 'persecution' may be
explained by a more comprehensive definition, one designed to elaborate on the
term in anticipation of a wide range of potential conduct; and that expanded
definition in turn may be influenced by how practical, or impractical, the
standard would be in terms of its application to specific cases.
Id.
74.
Ruesch, supra note 10, at 198-99; see also infra Part II.C (discussing
atrocities committed by child soldiers).
75.
See Human Rights First Brief, supra note 7, at 18 (arguing that the case of
child soldiers is one of the most compelling ones for the applicability of a duress
exception).
76.
See, e.g., Sackie v. Ashcroft, 279 F. Supp. 2d. 596 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (reviewing
a case in which an immigration judge did initially grant asylum to a child soldier in
spite of the persecutor bar, although ultimately granting relief on other grounds).
77.
See Ruesch, supra note 10, at 201 (explaining that it is an open issue as to
whether child soldiers who join military groups voluntarily may overcome the
persecutor bar); Nina Bernstein, Taking the War Out of a Child Soldier, N.Y. TIMES,
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The Material Support Bar

When the Refugee Act of 1980 was passed, the INA did not
include terrorism as a ground for inadmissibility.7 8 The development
of the modern "material support bar" began with the 1990
Amendments to the INA, which deemed aliens who had engaged in
terrorist activity "excludable."79 However, the first rendering of the
material support bar defined "terrorist activity" more narrowly than
the modern INA.80 The first significant expansion of the definition of
terrorism under the INA occurred in 1996 with the adoption of the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which
developed the process whereby the United States designates certain
groups as foreign terrorist organizations (FTO) and renders aliens
who provided material support to those organizations inadmissible.si
AEDPA initially limited FTOs to those officially designated as such
by the Secretary of State, together with the Secretary of the Treasury
and the Attorney General. 8 2 A series of antiterrorist legislation

May 13, 2007, at 1.29, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/13/nyregion/
13soldier.html.
REFUGEE COUNCIL USA, THE IMPACT OF THE MATERIAL SUPPORT BAR: U.S.
78.
REFUGEE ADMISSIONS PROGRAM FOR FIscAL YEAR 2006 AND 2007, at 5 (2006), available
at http://www.rcusa.org/uploads/pdfs/RCUSA2006finpostblw.pdf.
Id.; Immigration Act of 1990, P.L. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, § 601 (1990).
79.
The 1990 Amendment states:
80.
The term 'engage in terrorist activity' means to commit . . . an act which the
actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords material support .. . including
any of the following acts:
(I) The preparation or planning of a terrorist activity.
(II) The gathering of information on potential targets for terrorist activity.
(III) The providing of any type of material support, including a safe house,
transportation, communications, funds, false identification, weapons,
explosives, or training, to any individual the actor knows or has reason to
believe has committed or plans to commit an act of terrorist activity.
(IV) The soliciting of funds or other things of value for terrorist activity or
for any terrorist organization.
(V) The solicitation of any individual for membership in a terrorist
organization, terrorist government, or to engage in a terrorist activity.
Immigration Act of 1990, P.L. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, § 601 (1990).
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 10481.
132, §§ 302, 421, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (amending the INA and defining Foreign
Terrorist Organizations, barring from asylum and withholding of removal any person
who provided material support to a Foreign Terrorist Organization); REFUGEE COUNCIL
USA, supra note 78, at 5.
REFUGEE COUNCIL USA, supra note 78, at 5. The USA PATRIOT Act of
82.
2001 created three tiers of Foreign Terrorist Organizations and barred refugees who
provided material support to Tier II and Tier III organizations from asylum. Id. at A-5.
In addition, the Real ID Act of 2005 barred aliens who provided material support to
Tier I, Tier II and Tier III organizations. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13,
§ 103, 119 Stat. 231 (2005).
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The USA
created the material support currently in effect.83
in
were
enacted
PATRIOT Act of 2001 and the REAL ID Act of 2005
The
2001.84
11,
September
response to the terrorist attacks of
current statute renders an alien inadmissible, ineligible for asylum,
and deportable if the alien commits an act that he "knows, or
reasonably should know, affords material support .

.

. to a terrorist

85

The current material support bar is broad primarily
organization.
because of its grounding in a theory of negligence, the wide range of
acts deemed to constitute "material support," the expansive definition
of "terrorist organization," and the limited defenses available to an
alien. 86
a.

The Negligence Standard

The material support bar applies when an alien "reasonably
should know" that he is providing material support to a terrorist
organization.8 7 Therefore, an alien who did not actually know that he
88
was rendering material support is nonetheless ineligible for asylum.
For example, an alien who commits an act that he reasonably should
have known-but did not know-would afford material support to a
terrorist organization will be barred from asylum.89 Similarly, an
alien who commits an act that he fully knew would support an
organization that he did not know-although he should have
known-had terrorist ties would be barred from asylum.90 Most
alarmingly, an alien who commits an act, not knowing that it is
terrorist in nature and does so for an organization that he does not
know is affiliated with terrorism (again, although he should have)
9
may be barred from asylum. '
b.

Defining "Material Support"

The statute defines "material support" to include providing "a
safe house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of funds

REFUGEE COUNCIL USA, supra note 78, at 5.
83.
See REAL ID Act of 2005 § 103 (expanding further the definition of "engage
84.
in terrorist activity"); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act [USA PATRIOT Act], Pub. L.
No. 107-56, § 802, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (broadening the definition of terrorist activity).
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI), 8 U.S.C
85.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (2000).
See Theodore Roethke, American Law and the Problem of Coerced Provision
86.
of Support to a Terrorist Organizationas Grounds for Removal, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTs. L. REV. 173, 177-78 (2007) (describing the effect of the material support bar).
Id.
87.

88.
89.

Id.
Id.

90.

Id.

91.

Id.
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or other material financial benefit, false documentation or
identification, weapons, . . . explosives, or training."92 The prevailing
interpretation at DHS of this provision is that any support is
material.9 3 The Agency takes the view that material support
amounts to a term of art under which "all the listed types of
assistance are covered, irrespective of any showing that they are
independently 'material."' 94 Under this interpretation, any support,
no matter how small, would be considered material.95 Therefore, "if a
person gave 'even a glass of water' to a member of an armed group,
that act would qualify as material support."96 The BIA justified this
approach in Matter of S-K, noting "Congress has not expressly
indicated its intent to provide an exception for contributions which
are de minimis."97
Moreover, the courts have interpreted the list of activities
enumerated in the statute as "not exhaustive."9 8 In Singh-Kaur v.
Ashcroft, the Third Circuit explained that Congress's use of the word
"including" in the statute "suggests that Congress intended to
illustrate a broad concept rather than narrowly circumscrib[ing] a
term with exclusive categories."99 In Singh-Kaur, an Indian citizen
was found inadmissible because of his activities as a member of the
Babbar Khalsa in rendering material support to the fighters by
providing them with food and setting up tents on their behalf. 100
c.

Defining "Terrorist Organization"

The definition of "terrorist organizations" is complex and
Tier I
comprehensive, involving three tiers of organizations.' 0
includes those organizations that are designated by the Secretary of

See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI), 8 U.S.C.
92.
1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (2000) (defining "engaged in terrorist activity" to include
committing "an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know"); Roethke, supra
note 86, at 198.
In re S-K, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 945 (B.I.A. 2006).
93.
Id.
94.
Georgetown University Law Center, Human Rights Institute, May 2006
95.
Refugee Fact-Finding Investigation, Unintended Consequences: Refugee Victims of the
War on Terror, 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 759, 801 (2006) [hereinafter GULCI.
Id.
96.
97.
In re S-K, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 945.
Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 293, 298 (3d Cir. 2004).
98.
99.
Id.
Id. at 296, 301. The majority came to this conclusion over a long and vocal
100.
dissent by Judge Fisher where he noted that the Babbar Khalsa was not designated as
a terrorist organization by the State Department. Id. at 302 (Fisher, J., dissenting). In
addition, Judge Fisher argues that the support that Singh provided was not sufficient
to qualify as material and that "mere 'support' cannot be 'material support."' Id. at 304.
See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi), 8 U.S.C.
101.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi) (describing the different forms of "terrorist organization").
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State pursuant to procedures detailed in 8 U.S.C. § 1189.102 Tier I
includes organizations designated as such by the Secretary of State
"in consultation with or upon the request of the Attorney General or
the Secretary of Homeland Security."10 3 Significantly, in the case of a
designated FTO (a Tier I or Tier II organization), immigration judges
apply a strict liability standard with regard to the applicant's
knowledge that it is a terrorist organization, meaning there is no
mens rea element to the determination.10 4 As a result of this
heightened standard, an alien who provides material support to a
Tier I organization will be deemed per se inadmissible. 0 5 The Tier
III (non-designated) organizations are comprised of any "group of two
or more individuals, whether organized or not," that engages in
terrorist activities. 10 6 The inclusion of Tier III organizations within
the definition of "terrorist organization" has vast implications for the
breadth of the statute. 0 7 In practical terms, a group will become a
non-designated terrorist organization (Tier III organization) if there
is a group of more than one person and the group performs any
activity designated by the statute as a terrorist activity.s0 8 This
definition can therefore be used to exclude individuals who provide
Because no agency is
support to almost any armed group.' 0 9
designated to make the determinations of which groups qualify as
Tier III organizations under the statute, Department of Homeland

102.

Id. To be designated a Tier I organization:

the Secretary of State must find: (1) that the organization is a foreign
organization; (2) that it engages in terrorist activity or terrorism; and, (3) that
the terrorist activity or terrorism threatens the security of United States
nationals or the national security of the United States.
UNHCR, "MATERIAL SUPPORT" AND RELATED BARS TO REFUGEE PROTECTION: SUMMARY
OF KEY PROVISIONS OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT 1 (Dec. 15, 2006),

available at www.rcusa.org/uploads/pdfs/ms-summ-unhcrkeyprovl2-06.pdf. The statute
establishes a clear procedure to be "followed prior to designation, including publication
in the federal register." Id. In addition, the Department of State maintains an official
list of FTOs, available on its website at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/
123085.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2010). Id.
103.
INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II). Tier II
organizations are "groups that are 'otherwise designated' by the Department of State,
upon publication in the Federal Register, as a terrorist organization, after a finding
that the organization engages in certain terrorist activities defined under the INA."
UNHCR, supra note 102, at 1.
Laufer, supranote 14, at 460.
104.
105.
Id.
INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III).
106.
107.
REFUGEE COUNCIL USA, supranote 78, at 9.
108.
Id.
109.
See Jennie Pasquarella, Victims of Terror Stopped at the Gate to Safety: The
Impact of the "MaterialSupport to Terrorism"Bar on Refugees, 13 HUM. RTs. BRIEF 28,
29 (2006) (explaining that under the definition of "terrorist organization" any armed
group can be excluded from entry regardless of terrorist affiliation).
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Limited Defenses to the Material Support Bar

There is only one defense to the material support bar provided
under the statute.'
An alien may claim "lack of knowledge" in the
narrow circumstance where the alien was literally unaware that he
was providing material support.11 2 In order to overcome the material
support bar, an alien must show "by clear and convincing evidence
that the actor did not know, and should not reasonably have known,
that the organization was a terrorist organization."11 3 The difficulty
of meeting this standard can be illustrated with a brief example:
[A] Colombian . . . was forced to pay off a guerrilla group that is not
designated as a foreign terrorist organization but is nevertheless found
by an immigration judge to be a terrorist organization.
If the
Colombian applicant wishes to prove that he did not know and had no
reason to know that the group was a terrorist organization, the
immigration judge would inevitably ask why the applicant felt
compelled to pay the group in the first place. Arguably, the very threat
of harm and the credibility of the applicant's belief that harm would
befall him put the applicant on notice that the group might be a
terrorist organization.114

The official position of the Department of Homeland Security is that
the decision faced by the immigrant in this case amounts to an
exercise of free will in support of a terrorist organization, which
justifies the application of the material support bar."15
Like the persecutor bar, the material support bar does not
recognize an exception for duress.1 16 However, in December of 2007,
Congress established an additional protection for asylum applicants
and granted the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with
the Attorney General, the authority to issue waivers to the material
support bar where an alien is a member of certain enumerated groups
or is found to have provided support under duress.117 This waiver,
however, is narrowly worded and involves the exercise of

110.
Id.
111.
Morris, supra note 10, at 288; Pasquarella, supranote 109, at 29.
112.
Pasquarella, supra note 109, at 29.
113.
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(dd), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(dd) (2000). The BIA has held that the applicant has the burden
of proof under the statute. In re S-K, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 942 n.5 (B.I.A. 2006).
114.
Laufer, supra note 14, at 459 (explaining the application of the "lack of
knowledge" exception through this hypothetical).
115.
Id.
116.
Id. at 438, 442.
117.
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 691, 121
Stat. 1844(2007); see Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(d)(3)(B)(i)
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"unreviewable discretion" by the agency. 18 In order to qualify for a
waiver, an alien must prove that he is otherwise eligible for the
immigration benefit, pass background and security checks, fully
disclose all material support, and establish that he poses no danger to
the safety or security of the U.S."19 In addition, to qualify for the
duress waiver, an alien must overcome a weighing of interests.120
The factors weighed include: (1) whether the alien could have avoided
giving material support, (2) the severity and type of harm inflicted or
threatened as well as the likelihood of actual harm, and (3) to whom
the harm was directed.121 The waiver rules urge the Department of
Homeland Security to consider "the totality of the circumstances." 2 2
e.

Application of the Material Support Bar to Child Soldiers

A child soldier may be barred from receiving asylum under the
material support bar. The actions of child soldiers, even when that
term extends beyond children who serve as combatants, easily meet
the statute's low threshold of materiality.123 Moreover, the types of
organizations that recruit and use child soldiers, if not already
designated as Tier I or Tier II organizations, will almost always meet
the requirements of the more discretionary Tier III organizations.1 24
Although Congress has softened the statute, the new waiver is not a
panacea. By its plain text, the waiver will not apply to the case of
child soldiers who voluntarily joined military groups.1 25 The waiver's
focus on voluntariness remains a substantial bar to its use by child
soldiers who may not meet the conventional definition, but instead

118.

Immigration

and

Nationality

Act

§

212(d)(3)(B)(i),

8

U.S.C.

§ 1182(d)(3)(B)(i) (2000).
Memorandum from Jonathan Scharfen, Deputy Dir., U.S. Citizenship &
119.
Immigration Services, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., to Assoc. Dirs., U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration Services, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., II (May 24, 2007).
120.
Memorandum from Michael Chertoff, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.,
Exercise of Authority Under Sec. 212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the INA, 72 Fed. Reg. 26138, 2613839 (Apr. 27, 2007).

121.
122.

Id.
Id.

123.
See GULC, supra note 95, at 801 (explaining that "there are no exceptions
for levels of support so small that they could have no material effect on furthering
terrorist activity" such that even children who merely fill noncombat roles, such as
carrying supplies, would fall within this definition).
124.
See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III), 8 U.S.C.
or more
(2000) (including any "group of two
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III)
individuals . . . which engages in" terrorist activities as a terrorist group).
125.
See id. § 212(d)(3)(B)(i) ("[N]o such waiver may be extended to an alien who
is a member or representative of, has voluntarily and knowingly engaged in or
endorsed or espoused or persuaded others to endorse or espouse or support terrorist
activity.").
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were coerced by softer factors such as economic need or psychological
manipulation.1 26

B. Child Soldiers: Causes, Recruitment, and Experience
The practice of using child soldiers has led to the death of over
two million children and the maiming or disabling of another six
million. 127
Despite the fact that the use of child soldiers is
universally recognized as a violation of human rights and that a wide
variety of international agreements reject the practice, "[tihe
recruitment and use of child soldiers is a deliberate and systematic
choice currently being made the world over."' 2 8
Broadly, the use of child soldiers is the result of three factors:
social disruptions, technological advances, and new styles of
combat.' 2 9 First, social disruptions have created a population of
children who are "undereducated, malnourished, marginalized, and
disaffected."13 0
Perhaps obviously, one central cause of this
phenomenon is the proliferation of conflict and civil strife throughout
the world. 13 '
Children displaced because of conflict are at a
heightened risk of recruitment.132 Also, the spread of diseases, such
as AIDS, result in orphaned children and disrupted family networks,
which substantially contributes to the population of susceptible
youths.' 33 Second, advances in military technology have encouraged
the use of child soldiers.134 The so-called "Kalashnikov culture"' 3 5the proliferation of light and small weaponry like the AK-47-has
made the use of children as soldiers practical in a way it was not
previously.1 36 Historically, the use of arms relied on the strength and
skill of the human operator, thereby rendering children useless.' 3 7
By relying on new materials like plastics, small children can wield

126.
See infra Part II.B (discussing how some child soldiers are recruited by
means of such softer factors).
127.
Susan Tiefenbrun, Child Soldiers, Slavery and the Trafficking of Children,
31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 415, 421 (2008).
128.
SINGER, supra note 12, at 38. Singer notes that the following international
instruments reject the use of child soldiers: the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions, and the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child. Id. at 37.
129.
Id. at 37-38, 45-46.
130.
Id. at 39.
131.
See Tiefenbrun, supra note 127, at 421 (describing the present use of child
soldiers in over fifty countries worldwide).
132.
Id. at 420-21.
133.
Id. at 427-28.
134.
SINGER, supra note 12, at 45-46.
135.
Tiefenbrun, supra note 127, at 428; MICHAEL WESSELLS, CHILD SOLDIERS:
FROM VIOLENCE TO PROTECTION 17-19 (2006).
136.
Tiefenbrun, supra note 127, at 428-30.
137.
SINGER, supra note 12, at 46.
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the small arms now being produced as easily and effectively as an
adult.13 8 Finally, the shift in modern warfare to conflict driven by
profit has made child soldiers appealing because they are cheap and
easy to mobilize.13 9
Worldwide, most child soldiers are teenagers between the ages of
thirteen and eighteen because of their "size, strength, and cognitive
ability."140 However, there is an emerging trend of recruiting even
younger children-particularly preteen boys.141 During the conflicts
in Liberia and Sierra Leone, boys under the age of twelve were
specifically recruited and used in their own special units that had a
reputation for being particularly violent.142
The child soldiers
involved in the conflict in Northern Uganda have gradually gotten
younger, with an average age that is now below thirteen.143
Likewise, the children used in many conflicts in Asia are particularly
young: In a recent survey, the average age of child soldiers was
thirteen with over one-third of the children under the age of
twelve.144
A significant concern with child soldiers is that the recruitment
process is never truly voluntary.145 Children are at times recruited
by force,1 46 while in other cases there is an element of voluntariness,
although they are still likely being subjected to some form of
coercion. 14 7 Specifically, children subjected to "economic, cultural,
social, and/or political pressures."' 4 8 One of the primary reasons that
children join military groups is economic pressure-particularly the
need for food-and becoming involved with a military group may
appear to be their only option for survival.149 An equally compelling
force that influences some children is security; often children will be
manipulated and coerced into believing that the only way to protect
themselves and their families from the conflict is to join a military
group. 5 0 However, as one commenter eloquently explained "[t]he
complexity of such situations defies neat categories."i 5 1 Moreover,

138.
Id.
139.
Id. at 52-53.
140.
WESSELLS, supra note 135, at 7.
141.
Id.
142.
Id. (describing how the "small-boy units" were known for their "willingness
to commit barbarous acts").
143.
Id.
144.
Id.
145.
See Tiefenbrun, supranote 127, 426-27.
146.
Id.; see, e.g., ISHMAEL BEAH, A LONG WAY GONE 106-13 (2007) (describing
the author's own recruitment by an armed group in Sierra Leone).
147.
Id.
148.
Christy C. Fujio, Invisible Soldiers: How and Why Post-Conflict Processes
Ignore the Needs of Ex-Combatant Girls, 10 J. L. & Soc. CHALLENGES 1, 5 (2008).
149.
Id.
150.
Id.
151.
WESSELLS, supra note 135, at 33.
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even children who have "freely" chosen to join an armed group may
ultimately be forced or coerced into committing atrocities or staying
with the group against their will.' 5 2
While the recruitment process for child soldiers might be
multifaceted, the experience of child soldiers is consistently one of
victimization.15 3 Child soldiers are brainwashed "until their ethics
and moral values become so distorted that they believe doing evil is
good."1 54 The children frequently are intoxicated with mind-altering
drugs in order to make them fearless. 15 5 Child soldiers are often
forced to engage in hard labor such as carrying large loads of arms,
munitions, and equipment.1 56 When a child fails at one of his tasks,
he may be beaten or shot.15 7 Child soldiers may also be forced to
harm or even kill other children who break the group's rules.' 5 8 New
recruits are subjected to coercive indoctrination; for example, they
may be forced to eat the flesh of other child soldiers who tried to
escape or who were deemed "traitors," and after killing fellow
soldiers, they may be forced to smear themselves with the blood of
their former colleague.' 5 9 In spite of the terrible and violent acts that
child soldiers may commit, their experience is unique and deserves
special consideration.

III. ANALYSIS
The application of the persecutor bar and the material support
bar to child soldiers runs against social values and standards of moral
culpability as expressed in American jurisprudence. While child
soldiers are perceived as victims in popular culture and international
law, the asylum bars equate child soldiers with adults who have
committed serious acts of persecution or knowingly supported
terrorist organizations.
Two defenses that are fundamental to American criminal law
support a revised approach to child soldiers under immigration law.

152.
Id. (explaining that many children choose to join armed groups but then
regret their decision).
153.
Tiefenbrun, supra note 127, at 423.
154.
Id. at 423-24.
155.
Id. (describing the psychological torture that forms part of the
indoctrination of child soldiers including being "threatened with death and/or
dismemberment if they don't fight, forced to return to their own village to witness or
participate in the death or disfigurement of their own family members, required to kill
friends who don't obey the commanders, and made to watch the punishment of other
child soldiers").
156.
Fujio, supra note 148, at 6.

157.
158.

Id.
Id.

159.

Tiefenbrun, supra note 127, at 424.
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First, while criminal law in the United States recognizes that
children should be treated differently for the purposes of criminal
liability because of their age (the defense of infancy), there is no
corollary in the treatment of children under immigration law.
Second, the persecutor bar as historically interpreted by Fedorenko
and the material support bar did not take into consideration the
special concerns of voluntariness with regard to children. 160 Duress
has not been recognized as a defense to either the persecutor bar or
the material support bar, and although there may be policy reasons
for this approach with regard to adults, the rationale is less
persuasive as applied to child soldiers.
Beyond the significant theoretical justifications for a new
approach to U.S. immigration law for child soldiers, there are
important practical considerations that weigh in favor of legislative
reform. Although it may seem counterintuitive to bring children who
have been brainwashed and indoctrinated in violence into the United
States, there are significant benefits to doing so for the international
community as a whole.
A. Defenses
1.

Infancy: The Need for Special Treatment of Children

The defense of infancy is grounded in common sense; even
though children might commit acts intentionally, they are
nonetheless "cognitively and emotionally immature" and therefore
not as capable of distinguishing right and wrong. 161 The common law
rule on which the American defense is based has evolved over
centuries. 162 Roman law deemed children under the age of seven doli
incapax-incapable of evil. 163 Perhaps drawing from this Roman
tradition by way of canon law, early English common law permitted
the pardon of young children. 164 By the thirteenth century, there was
a well-established presumption against criminal liability for young
children in England. 165 By the seventeenth century, the common law
had developed into the law as it exists in the present under which:
"(1) children under seven had no criminal capacity; (2) children at age
fourteen and over had the same criminal capacity as adults; and (3)

160.
See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512-16 (1980) (failing to
provide discussion of whether the same standard would apply to children).
161.
Barbara Kaban & James Orlando, Revitalizing the Infancy Defense in the
ContemporaryJuvenile Court, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 33, 35 (2007).
162.
Id. at 35-37.
163.
Id. at 36.
Id.
164.
165.
See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 485 (4th ed. 2003) (describing the
evolution of the common law since Roman times).
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children over seven and under fourteen were presumed to be without
capacity, but this presumption could be rebutted in an individual
case."16 6 American colonists adopted the English common law
defense along with its gradated view of culpability, with children
167
closest in age to seven receiving the strongest presumption.
Currently, the application of the infancy defense in the United States
is primarily addressed by statute and the age at which the infancy
defense applies varies by jurisdiction.' 6 8 Significantly, it is the age at
the time of the alleged conduct and not at the time of prosecution that
is controlling.169
Criminal law in the United States and in many international
jurisdictions revolves around the theory that an individual should
only be held criminally responsible for acts that he intended to
commit.1 70 It is not enough for criminal liability to simply have
engaged in a wrongful act; criminal law requires a guilty mind as
well. 171 The infancy defense is an excuse defense, and it negates
criminal capacity-excluding children from culpability on the basis of
their age alone.172 In reality, capacity overlaps with the concept of
mens rea: in order for an individual to have the mens rea necessary to
commit an offense, he must have the underlying capacity for
culpability. 7 3 Mens rea addresses whether an individual had the
state of mind required by law in order for the crime to be judged
blameworthy by society.1 74 By contrast, capacity addresses whether
an individual has some underlying absence of judgment that would
75
The
exclude him from the force of normal criminal law.1
who
justification for excuse based on capacity is that an individual
lacks capacity does not understand the difference between right and
wrong; basically, such an individual lacks the moral compass that
society generally presumes.176
The defense of infancy, in particular, relies on the fact that
compared to his adult counterpart the average child has a

Id. at 485-86.
166.
Kaban & Orlando, supra note 161, at 37.
167.
Id. at 487. Relatively few states follow the common law format. Instead,
168.
most statutes simply specify an age below which capacity is presumed to be impossible.
Id. Although the statutes vary somewhat as to age, the common law age of fourteen is
the norm. Id.
Id. at 487.
169.
CRIMINAL
POPOVSKI, INTERNATIONAL
KARIN ARTS & VESSELIN
170.
ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 71 (2006); Frederick Woodbridge,
Physical and Mental Infancy in the Criminal Law, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 426, 426 (1939);.
ARTS & POPOVSKI, supra note 170, at 71.
171.
172.
Id.
Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31
173.
UCLA L. REV. 503, 537 (1984).
Id. at 537-38.
174.
Id. at 538.
175.
Id. at 538-39.
176.
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substantially more limited capacity to make moral judgments.1 7 7 Not
only is this an intuitively satisfying assumption, it is also grounded in
psychological and medical research on the cognitive development of
children. 178 As early as the 1930s, studies indicated that the capacity
of children to engage in moral judgment differed from adults and
developed in stages as children aged. 179 These studies demonstrated
that children under the age of seven or eight only perceive morality
"in terms of objective consequences of the act being assessed." 80 In
essence, children in this early stage do not perceive right and wrong
in the same way as adults; they apply objective criteria like
numerosity and size instead of the subjective intent of the actor to
decide which acts are more morally blameworthy.181 Medical studies
using magnetic resonance imaging have also demonstrated structural
differences in the brains of children and teenagers compared to adults
that impact their moral capacity.1 82 Most significantly, these studies
have demonstrated that "the regions of the brain associated with
impulse control, risk assessment and moral reasoning develop last,
after late adolescence."1 83 These findings underscore why the defense
of infancy is a relevant consideration in formulating the asylum bars
differently for child soldiers and why differential treatment for
children has independent analytical force beyond simply drawing an
analogy to criminal law.
Applying the asylum bars to children in the same way they are
applied to adults is at odds with the treatment of children under U.S.
criminal law. In particular, the asylum bars as they are currently
written do not reflect society's values and the law's assessment of the
capacity of children to engage in a wrongful act.
First, although asylum law differs from criminal law in that
asylum law is widely understood as conferring a benefit while the
principal concern of criminal law is punishment, it makes sense to
assess the blameworthiness of child behavior using a consistent
standard. Second, the long and continued application of the defense

177.
Id. at 539.
178.
Id.; Kaban & Orlando, supra note 161, at 47-51.
179.
Walkover, supra note 173, at 540 (describing a famous study of moral
development by Jean Piaget).
180.
Id.
181.
Id. at 540-41. Walkover illustrates this development through the example
of one of the case studies posed to children in Jean Piaget's study. Children were asked
to assess the culpability of two children: one, who knocked over and broke fifteen cups
that were hidden from view and a second, who broke just one cup but did so in
sneaking jam from a cupboard without permission. Id. Children in the first stage of
moral development found the child who broke more cups to be more blameworthy
instead of focusing on bad intent like most adults. Id.
182.
Brief for the American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent at 10, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004
WL1633549 [hereinafter AMA Brief]; Kaban & Orlando, supra note 161, at 47-48.
183.
AMA Brief, supra note 182, at 11.
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of infancy reflects society's judgment that children should not be held
accountable for their crimes until achieving a certain level of
maturity. 184 The fact that children are not treated differently under
asylum bars indicates the bars do not fully reflect American society's
assessment of the blameworthiness of the acts committed by child
soldiers. Third, the medical and psychological underpinnings of the
infancy defense strongly support concessions for children. Children
are less morally blameworthy because they are physically incapable
of forming the type of criminal intent that deserves society's
condemnation and that justifies the denial of a benefit.' 8 5 Child
soldiers deserve to be treated differently even when they commit
atrocities deserving of condemnation. Especially because many of the
children recruited as child soldiers are well below the age of fourteen,
their participation in acts of persecution or in rendering material
support to terrorist organizations cannot be based upon a morally
culpable decision-making process.'8 6
2.

Heightened Duress Concerns for Child Soldiers

While the establishment of a blanket defense of duress to either
the persecutor bar or the material support bar remains
contentious,' 8 7 there are considerations surrounding the specific case
of child soldiers that support taking duress into consideration when
assessing the merits of their asylum claims. The disagreement over
the blanket applicability of a duress defense stems from the fact that
duress is not as easily reconcilable with American conceptions of
morality as the defense of infancy.' 88 Duress applies under criminal
law in morally ambiguous situations in which people will differ in
their belief as to whether conduct amounts to morally blameworthy

184.
See Kaban & Orlando, supra note 161, at 37 (noting that the common law
infancy defense is centuries old); Woodbridge, supra note 170, at 426-27 (stating that
"intent" has long been required for criminal culpability and that children have been
thought unable to formulate criminal intent).
185.
See Kaban & Orlando, supra note 161, at 38.
186.
See WESSELLS, supra note 135, at 33 (describing the coercive forces which
cause children to join armed groups and prevent them from leaving).
187.
See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1168 (2009) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("The majority appears to leave that question undecided . .. two Justices
forthrightly disagree and would require the agency to recognize at least some sort of
duress exception . . . . But good reasons for the agency's current practice exist . . . .");
Lerescu, supra note 30, at 1888-1900, 1907 (arguing in favor of interpreting Fedorenko
to include "an implied excuse for actions committed under duress").
188.
See Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse
and Searching for its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1331-33 (1989)
(describing the "love-hate" relationship our society has with the duress defense).
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behavior.s8 9 Concurring in Negusie v. Holder, Justice Scalia argues
that "[t]he culpability of one who harms another under coercion is,
and has always been, a subject of intense debate, raising profound
questions of moral philosophy and individual responsibility." 9 0 Case
law interpreting the persecutor bar and the material support bar may
also pose a problem to implementing a blanket duress defense.'19
Like infancy, duress under U.S. criminal law is generally viewed
as an excuse. 9 2 At common law, duress was one of three forms of
compulsion "accorded exculpatory significance."' 93 There are seven
core requirements to the common law definition of duress: (1) the
individual must have "no reasonable opportunity to escape from the
coercive situation," (2) the threat must be significant, (3) the
"threatened harm must be illegal," (4) the harm must be imminent,
(5) the individual must not "have placed herself voluntarily in a
situation in which she could expect to be subject to coercion," (6)
duress is not a defense to murder, and (7) the individual must have
been acting on a "specific command."194 Although duress is a common
law standard that varies from state to state, the Supreme Court has
accepted it as a defense and thirteen states apply the Model Penal
Code (MPC) standard. 9 5 The Supreme Court has described duress in
a footnote as excusing "criminal conduct, 'if at all, because given the
circumstances other reasonable men must concede that they too
96
would not have been able to act otherwise."'1
The modern version of duress can be explained on a number of
theoretical grounds.' 9 7 Under a theory of utilitarianism, prosecuting

189.
Id. Dressler poses a hypothetical of a person who kills an innocent child
because terrorists have placed a gun to his head. Id. He illustrates that in this
situation it is unclear whether the killer is a victim or a "villain." Id.
190.
Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. at 1169 (Scalia, J., concurring).
191.
Lerescu, supra note 30, at 1900; see Laufer, supra note 14, at 455-58
(attempting to reconcile the Fedorenko decision with duress under the material support
bar). Lerescu argues that a blanket defense of duress may not even be desirable and
instead advocates for a limited defense that is applicable only "in response to the most
,credible threats of imminent death or severe bodily harm." Lerescu, supra note 30, at
1901.
192.
See Dressler, supra note 188, at 1356 (noting that "most states treat duress
as an excuse"). Note, however, that this is not without contention. See, e.g., Roethke,
supra note 86, at 179 (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW
433 (2d ed. 1986)).
193.
Dressler, supranote 188, at 1335.
194.
Claire 0. Finkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical Account of the Defense in
Law, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 251, 254 (1995).
195.
Dressler, supra note 188, at 1335, 1343-44; see United States v. Bailey, 444
U.S. 394, 411 n.8 (1980) (mentioning cases which define the limits of the duress
defense and the MPC); Roethke, supra note 86, at 180-81 (analyzing Bailey).
196.
Bailey, 444 U.S. at 411 n.8; see also Morris, supra note 10, at 293
(explaining the duress defense).
197.
Laufer, supra note 14, at 451-52; see also Dressler, supra note 188, at
1349-74 (explaining the legal theories supporting the duress defense).
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a person who acted under duress is ineffective because it cannot
dissuade the behavior; under this approach an individual subject to
duress is viewed as a victim rather than a perpetrator.1 98
By
contrast, under the theoretical approach of retributivism, duress is
justified on the grounds that if the individual subjected to duress did
not act willingly, it is not fair to punish him. 199
The policies justifying the continued relevance of duress under
U.S. criminal law provide a compelling justification to rethink the
harsh application of the asylum bars to the case of child soldiers. The
atrocities committed by child soldiers are easily viewed as coerced
and performed under duress. Three key features of the child soldier
experience underline the analytical appropriateness of duress to their
First, the young age of the children
applications for asylum.
recruited to be soldiers makes them more susceptible to coercion. 200
This directly addresses the fourth requirement of duress: that an
individual may not have "placed herself voluntarily in a situation in
which she could expect to be subject to coercion." 20 1 Moreover, as
addressed above, children do not truly exercise free will when they
join military groups; they are coerced into participation either
directly by force or indirectly through economic, social, and political
pressures. 202 Second, the leaders of military groups often subject
child soldiers to threats of severe injury and even death. 203 These
threats amount to both "imminent" and "significant" harm. 204 Third,
the mind-altering substances given to child soldiers and the
brainwashing techniques used to control their behavior amount to
continuous threats from which child soldiers have "no reasonable
opportunity to escape."205 Over time, the children become so removed
from their former lives and so brainwashed that they will not even
escape when given the chance. 206
Cumulatively, the experience of child soldiers amounts to a
heightened form of duress, rendering them deserving of special
consideration in spite of the acts of persecution they perpetrate and
the support they might provide to groups designated as terrorists.

198.
Laufer, supra note 14, at 452.
199.
Id.
200.
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1967) (describing how children must be
treated carefully in the criminal investigation context because of their susceptibility to
coercion).
201.
Finkelstein, supra note 194, at 254.
202.
See supra Part II.B (discussing the pressures leading children to become
child soldiers); see also Fujio, supra note 148, at 5.
203.
See supra Part II.B (describing how leaders coerce children into remaining
in military groups); see also Fujio, supra note 148, at 6.
204.
See Finkelstein, supra note 194, at 254 (noting the requirements for a
duress defense).
Id. at 254 (noting the requirements for a duress defense); Fujio, supra note
205.
148, at 7.
206.
Fujio, supranote 148, at 7.

2010/

A CHANCE FOR REDEMPTION

217

First, the severity of the coercion experienced by child soldiers
renders application of the defense less morally ambiguous than some
cases to which the defense of duress is applied. Second, the two main
theoretical justifications for the defense are a close fit with the
experience of child soldiers. A utilitarian view demonstrates that
because the participation of the children in atrocities was not truly
voluntary, subsequently denying them a benefit as a result of this
conduct will not dissuade their behavior or the behavior of similarly
situated children. 20 7 An analysis under a retributivist approach
likewise demonstrates the special applicability of duress to child
soldiers. The involuntary nature of the recruitment and experience of
child soldiers makes it unfair to punish them through the denial of
asylum because their conduct is less worthy of society's blame. 208

B. PracticalConsiderations:Asylum as the Best Solution
Beyond the theoretical justifications for a new approach to
asylum bars for child soldiers, there are practical concerns posed by
the current legal framework.
These problems are grounded in
concern for the health and safety of child soldiers, as well as
international security.
One key concern is whether it is desirable to grant asylum to
child soldiers who have been brainwashed and turned into aggressive
killers. Concurring in Negusie v. Holder, Justice Scalia argued that
"there may well be reasons to think that those who persecuted others,
even under
duress,
would be relatively undesirable
as
immigrants." 209 In the case of child soldiers, however, it is important
to realize that "children are resilient" and that most child soldiers are
"able to reintegrate into civilian life with varying degrees of
success." 210 Thus, the greater chance of full rehabilitation in the case
of child soldiers is reason enough to consider a less restrictive
approach to asylum. Justice Scalia also questioned the prudence of
granting both the persecutor and the victim asylum in the United
States. 211 Again, the case of child soldiers presents different
considerations than in a classic relationship between persecutor and
victim. 212 Child soldiers, though objectively engaging in persecutory
acts, are at the same time victims of their commanders because of the

207.
See Laufer, supra note 14, at 452 (describing the utilitarian support of the
duress defense).
208.
See id. (describing the retributivist support of the duress defense).
Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1169 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
209.
210.
Michael Wessells, Psychological Issues in Reintegrating Child Soldiers, 37
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 513, 515 (2004).
211.
Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. at 1169 (Scalia, J., concurring).
212.
See Ruesch, supra note 10, at 199 ("[D]ue to the huge increase of forcible
conscription of children the bright line between persecutor and victim is blurred.").
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"fear, brutality and psychological manipulation" to which they are
subjected. 213 In this sense, child soldiers and their victims are more
similarly situated than in other cases in which an alien is seeking
asylum-both are victims of the leaders of the armed groups who
employ child soldiers. 214
There is also a valid concern that the United States should not
adopt a policy that makes admission of child soldiers easier; instead,
why not just work to reintegrate the former combatants into their
home countries? The reality is that in most situations reintegration
may be the best solution and the quickest way for a former child
soldier to recover from the stress of his experience. 215 Returning
child soldiers to their families helps the ex-combatants "regain a
sense of normalcy" and helps to aid in their recovery from PostTraumatic Stress Disorder.21 6 However, a child may face a real
threat of harm from his former community, his former rebel group, or
the government of the country in which he fought, such that
reintegration may be impossible. 217
In some cases, communities may not be aware that the children
were forcibly recruited to join military groups and may retaliate
against them.2 18 One study determined that "82 percent of parents
considered former child soldiers to represent a potential danger to the
population." 219 Communities may also feel unable to forgive the
crimes committed by the former child soldiers. 220 Alternatively,
communities may be concerned that the return of child soldiers could
lead the rebel groups to return as well. 221
There are also special concerns that confront girls who served as
child soldiers. Women and children may be marginalized in the
official Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)
programs and therefore not qualify for the same types of
See SINGER, supra note 12, at 71-75 (describing the tactics used by
213.
commanders to indoctrinate child soldiers).
Ruesch, supra note 10, at 199 ("Child-soldiers, arguably persecutors of
214.
others, instead should be treated as victims of forced military conscription by military
and guerilla leaders.").
215.
See, e.g., Wessells, supra note 210, at 516-17 (describing the use of a
traditional spiritual healer to cleanse the child of a spirit that was haunting him).
216.
SINGER, supra note 12, at 200.
217.
See Wessells, supra note 210, at 516-18 (explaining the fears of one child
who believed that he would be "slaughtered" if he was returned to his village); Beth
Verhey, Child Soldiers: Prevention, Demobilization and Reintegration, WORLD BANK
CONFLIcT PREVENTION & RECONSTRUCTION UNIT, Soc. DEV. DEP'T: DISSEMINATION
NOTES, May 2002, at 1, 1, http://cpr.web.cern.ch/cpr/Library/article-childsold.pdf
(explaining that militaries may manipulate the reintegration process in order to recruit
former child soldiers).
Wessells, supra note 210, at 516.
218.
SINGER, supra note 12, at 200.
219.
220.
INT'L LABOUR ORG. [ILO], REINTEGRATING CHILD SOLDIERS 2 (2003),
www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/crisis/download/factsheet3.pdf.
221.
Verhey, supra note 217, at 3.
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psychological support and training as the men. 2 22 In addition, girls
and women may face stronger rejection and stigmatization from their
former communities. 223
Former girl child combatants may be
perceived as "'immoral,' 'promiscuous,' or 'unclean' because they have
been sexually abused."224 They also may be seen as a danger to the
community because they might contaminate the "purer" girls who did
not serve as combatants, attract rebel groups who will come back and
reclaim them, and bring bad luck.2 25 The community rejection may
also be particularly harmful for ex-combatant girls because, with no
prospect of getting married, they may have no viable way to sustain
themselves in a society with fixed gender roles. 226
One of the most significant dangers to ex-combatant child
soldiers is the risk of forced reenlistment. In areas where conflict is
ongoing, children may be recaptured by their former military
groups.2 27 For example, the first group of child soldiers who were
assisted by the DDR program in Angola after the signing of the
Lusaka Protocol in 1994 is suspected to have been re-recruited by the
National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). 228
Children also face risks from the military establishment, which may
attempt to manipulate the reintegration process to enlist the excombatants in the military. 22 9
Where child soldiers cannot be reintegrated into their former
communities, it is in the interest of both domestic and international
security to remove them from the locality. 230 If the former child
soldiers remain near the former or current zone of conflict, they
remain at higher risk for continued violent and criminal behavior. 231
These ex-combatants are more susceptible to involvement in
subsequent conflict, which may serve as a destabilizing force within a
country. 232
In addition, studies have demonstrated that countries with large
populations of young men who lack stabilizing influences from older
members of their community render a community more susceptible to

222.
Fujio, supra note 148, at 9-10.
223.
Id. at 11.
224.
Id.
225.
Id. at 11-12.
226.
Id. at 12.
227.
See Wessells, supra note 210, at 521 (describing re-recruitment of child
soldiers in Afghanistan and Angola).
228.
Id.
229.
Verhey, supra note 217, at 1-2.
230.
See SINGER, supra note 12, at 201 (stating that experience in West Africa
tends to show this is the best course of action).
231.
Id. at 186.
232.
See id. at 186 ("[U]nless we're able to focus on this teenage population
specifically ... it'll be the teenager who picks up the gun and starts the next cycle."
(internal citation omitted)).
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violence.2 33 Young men, because they are "psychologically more
aggressive" are especially likely to compete for resources, thereby
creating conflict. 234 Allowing young men who have been unable to
reintegrate into society to remain in the area of conflict is likely to
serve as a destabilizing force for the country and render it susceptible
to new conflicts. 235
For those former child soldiers who are rejected by their
communities, asylum may be the only option for escaping a life of
conflict. As such, the United States has both a humanitarian interest
and a national security interest in permitting former child soldiers to
receive asylum and providing them with an opportunity to
reintegrate into normal society.

IV. SOLUTION

A. Leave it to the BIA: A New Agency Interpretationof
the PersecutorBar
The court's recent decision in Negusie v. Holder has opened the
door to the possibility of a new agency interpretation of the
persecutor bar. 236 The BIA should implement a duress defense upon
rehearing the case. However, in formulating the elements of the
defense of duress in the context of the persecutor bar, the BIA should
take into consideration the plight of current child soldiers under the
bar and recognize a "softer" duress standard. In particular, the BIA
should soften the element of coercion for child soldiers because of the
ease with which children are manipulated, their reduced capacity to
form a culpable state of mind, and the developmental constraints they
confront in determining right from wrong.
Specifically, a defense of duress under the bar should establish a
presumption of involuntariness in favor of applicants who make an
adequate factual showing that they in fact served as child soldiers.
Such a presumption is justified by the coercive conditions leading to
the decision of a child to join a military group. In "voluntarily"
joining such a group, a child may believe that he has no other way to
survive, and this could, in fact, be true. Even in the least persuasive
case-a child who actively seeks out a rebel group to join-there is
very little chance the child made a true choice.

233.
Id. at 41.
234.
Id.
235.
See id. (describing the competitive nature of young men and their
susceptibility to the influence of demagogues, warlords, and criminals).
236.
See Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1162 (2009) (determining that the
BIA misapplied Fedorenko and remanding for the agency to interpret the statute free
from error).
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In order to accommodate the tougher cases along the continuum
of voluntariness, such as the decision of a seventeen year-old child to
join a military group, the BIA should implement a sliding scale
dependent upon the age the child when he was recruited. However, it
is important that the age of recruitment rather than the age of
perpetration of atrocities be used in applying the presumption. A
child brought into a military group at age six and who is brainwashed
and indoctrinated by a rebel group should have the benefit of such a
presumption even for acts he committed at an older age.
B. Special Rules: The Legislative Option
Because of the uniqueness of child soldiers' circumstances in the
immigration context, Congress should enact explicit exceptions to the
bars in the case of child soldiers. Both the persecutor bar and the
material support bar unduly burden the efforts of these children to
receive asylum. Moreover, the judgment by both the United States as
well as the international community of the moral reprehensibility of
the practice of recruiting child soldiers cuts in favor of enacting a
statutory framework that privileges its child-victims.
Effective legislation would implicate a separate standard for
granting asylum to child soldiers. Once a child affirmatively met his
burden of demonstrating that he was a refugee within the meaning of
the INA, the burden would not shift to the government to raise
potential statutory bars. Instead, an element would be added to the
applicant's burden: to demonstrate that he did in fact serve as a child
soldier. However, upon the immigration judge's determination that
the alien had in fact been a child soldier, there would be no further
means to deny asylum. Implementing this legislation is important for
a number of reasons. First, this approach eliminates the current
problem confronting child soldiers, namely, the voluntariness of their
decision to join the military group. As discussed above, the decision
of a child soldier to join a military group is never truly voluntary, and
this legislation would recognize that lack of choice. Second, the
current process of pursuing asylum for child soldiers is burdensome,
even for those with strong cases. This legislation would increase
certainty in the process, allowing the child soldier to prepare a
straightforward prima facie case that eliminates the possibility that
statutory bars will slow or end his application. This eliminates the
confusing and discretionary waiver process under the material
support bar for these children. Modifying the bars themselves would
lead to greater complexity and less certainty. Third, even with the
possibility of a new approach to duress by the BIA, this legislation
still provides the added benefit of a particularized approach to child
soldiers. While the implementation of a duress defense would aid
most cases of child soldiers, the protections would still be weaker and
more difficult to obtain than the legislation proposed here.
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V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the problem posed by the persecutor bar and
material support bar as they are currently written and applied is that
they were never intended to apply to children. Both bars were
responsive to concerns of particular moments in time: the persecutor
bar to the Holocaust and the current material support bar to the
attacks of September 11, 2001. Neither bar anticipated application to
a population like child soldiers.
Although the predominant concerns of immigration law differ
substantially in focus from criminal law, the asylum bars are wellaligned with criminal law theory. The decision to grant asylum is
ultimately a decision to confer a benefit upon an alien who we, as a
society, have deemed worthy. Like criminal law, underlying this
decision is a determination of the actor's moral culpability. Applying
the theory behind the defenses of infancy and duress to the asylum
bars at hand helps tie the culpability determination in the realm of
immigration to principles that have motivated society's decisions
regarding culpability for centuries.
The children forced to serve as soldiers deserve our compassion
rather than our moral opprobrium. Moreover, those children in the
position of applying for asylum are likely to view it as a last hope for
escape from a society that has tormented and rejected them. The
United States is in a position to grant these children the possibility of
rehabilitation and the opportunity to pursue the American Dream.
Although the United States is not in a position to eliminate the
practice of recruiting child soldiers throughout the world, it is in the
position to welcome its victims with open arms.
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